Big boys, big guns
By CHARU SUDAN KASTURI
The Telegraph (India)
The Telegraph (India)
Commander Zhang Zaige shows an anti-ship and anti-torpedo missile launcher on board the Weifang. Picture by Charu Sudan Kasturi
Qingdao: Commander Zhang Zaige flashed the smile of a proud parent as he showed off the weapon systems on board the Weifang, the warship he captains that is one of the latest additions to the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s growing fleet.
The 76mm anti-aircraft gun on the frigate’s deck and the missiles aimed at intercepting enemy torpedoes and targeting ships are standard. The Indian Brahmos missile has a longer range. What has changed is China’s threat perception.
As China hardens its position on disputes with neighbours over islands and reefs in the South China Sea, the American move to pivot strategically towards the Asia-Pacific region has pushed India’s growing alliance with Japan and the US into sharp focus for Beijing and its military.
“I believe Japan and the US are trying to contain and encircle China,” said Rear Admiral Wang Ling, Zhang’s boss and the second in command of the North Sea Fleet that includes the Weifang, commissioned just this June.
One of China’s three navy fleets, the North Sea Fleet is based out of this port town 800km south-east of Beijing that is popular among Chinese tourists looking for a summer getaway and is the home of two of China’s best known global exports — Haier home appliances and Tsingtao beer.
Wang was responding to a question by The Telegraph on whether he thought Japan and the US, through their alliances with India, were trying to check China’s maritime growth.
What Wang said points to China’s growing tensions with two of its historical rivals in an ocean named after peace. What he did not mention —India — reflects Beijing’s concern: that New Delhi may get pulled into an alliance that China is convinced is ultimately aimed at containing it. It’s a concern betrayed repeatedly by Chinese officers, military officers and researchers — some subtly, others more explicitly.
China is lodged in a tussle with many of its neighbours — the Philippines, Vietnam and Japan — over islands in the seas that connect these nations. The intensification of these tussles has coincided with the US stating its intention to pivot towards the Asia-Pacific region as a focus of its naval activities. Added to the mix is the trilateral dialogue that India, Japan and the US have held four times since 2011.
“These are not innocent activities,” said Colonel Li Xiaolu, a PLA officer who researches on China’s strategic affairs at Beijing’s National Defense University. “The alliance between Japan, India and the US is definitely aimed at restricting China.”
Most countries in the Asia-Pacific Rim region point to China’s increasing maritime assertiveness as the trigger for the new scramble for the seas. China’s Navy, traditionally content to focus on its territorial waters, earned itself the mandate to evolve into a bluewater force for the first time under a key decision taken at the 18th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012 that saw the public anointment of Xi Jinping as the country’s new leader after a once-in-decade leadership change. This new mandate means the navy can operate in the open seas.
China has demanded that Japan give up the Diaoyu Islands — known as the Senkaku Islands in Japanese — in the East China Sea, and that Vietnam and the Philippines “return” to China islands and reefs they hold but that China insists were historically its.
And earlier this month, Wang’s North Sea Fleet participated in joint exercises with the Russian Navy in the Japan Sea, where the ships were seen from Japanese land by locals of the northern tip of the island of Hokkaido. This was uncharted territory for the PLA Navy.
But China is adamant that its actions are motivated purely by self-defence and a desire to protect its sovereign territories, ideally diplomatically. Listing out the key security threats faced by the country, the PLA’s latest white paper published this April says “some neighbouring countries are taking actions that complicate or exacerbate the situation” regarding China’s maritime security and sovereignty. “And Japan is making trouble over the Diaoyu Islands.”
The white paper then goes on to talk about Japan’s definite push towards forging stronger alliances with other Asian nations, including India. “Some country has strengthened its Asia-Pacific military alliances, expanded its military presence in the region, and frequently makes the situation there tenser.”
The Chinese ministry of foreign affairs strategic research journal — China International Studies — was even more direct in its June edition, accessed by this newspaper. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who triggered an uproar in China by challenging the historically documented widespread sexual abuse of Chinese women by Japanese soldiers during their occupation, is seeking Indian cooperation in encircling China, researcher Zhang Yaohua has asserted in the journal. This “cooperation” includes the first senior-level joint maritime affair dialogue between India and Japan this past January.
“Later, Japan approved the export of ‘US-2’ seaplanes to India in order to strengthen communications with India and contain China,” the journal said, referring to amphibious planes Tokyo agreed to sell during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Japan in May.
Skipping niftily up and down steep ladders inside the Weifang, a Type 54A frigate, ship captain Zhang eventually reached some of his choicest charges: missiles sheltered inside the hull, unseen from outside. At Zhang’s command, the hull will open up, and the missiles will swivel on their axis to point seawards. They will most likely point eastwards, away from India and its ships.
But the increasing tensions in the seas around China have also injected uncertainty over the kind of missions the Weifang and its sister ships may need to embark on, and who their targets may be. Zhang is still waiting for orders. “I don’t know what mission I’ll be assigned,” he said.
(The reporter visited China last week at the invitation of the All China Journalists’ Association)
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RELATED STORY:
Why Joe Biden’s trip to Delhi may boost Indo-US bilateral ties
By Rajeev Sharma
First Post (India)
First Post (India)
Biden will be correcting an important anomaly with his visit: AP
United States Vice President Joe Biden will be arriving in New Delhi on Monday evening for probably the first-ever structured and substantive bilateral visit (22-25 July) as he is set to unveil a decades-long vision of close Indo-US strategic partnership and discuss measures of taking bilateral trade from the current $100 billion to $500 billion.
But before we get down to examining the purpose of Biden’s India visit, the agenda and the expected outcome, here are a few fact checks.
American Vice Presidents have rarely visited the Indian sub-continent. Since India’s independence, only two Vice Presidents of the United States have visited India. The first one was way back in 1966 when Hubert Humphrey visited New Delhi and that visit was followed by George HW Bush who visited India as Vice President in 1984.
Neither of the two visits created waves for bilateral reasons. Humphrey’s India visit took place more out of diplomatic protocol to attend the funeral of Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri. However, Humphrey’s brief visit triggered international news headlines as he was closeted with the then Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin who was representing the Soviet Union at the funeral.
Joe Biden will be correcting an important anomaly in Indo-US bilateral relations by embarking on a major visit to India and discussing core policy issues covering a wide gamut of bilateral, regional and international subjects of mutual interest.
This vice-presidential visit promises to be the most important event in Indo-US bilateral engagement since President Barack Obama came to India in November 2010 and announced a major policy shift of American support to India’s candidature for permanent membership of the United Nations.
This conclusion can safely be drawn from a very extensive background teleconference call organized by the White House on 19 July, announcing Biden’s visit to India and Singapore. Interestingly, all the questions were India-specific and not a single question was asked about the Singapore leg of Biden’s two-nation tour, prompting a senior Obama administration official to provide information about his engagements in Singapore suo moto.
This is indeed a far cry from the situation two decades ago when the Indian government had to buy advertisement space in leading American newspapers to publicize details about then prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao’s US visit, as no major American paper published the Indian embassy’s press release on Rao’s trip to the US.
This time the Ministry of External Affairs has not held any briefing – on record or on background – on Biden’s India visit thus far, nor does it seem likely even after the visit is over.
Biden is likely to have very meaty and substantive discussions on many issues. There can be nothing more categoric than this statement from a senior Obama administration official about Biden’s upcoming India visit: “I think you can expect the Vice President to set out an ambitious vision for the US-India relationship, looking not just at the months ahead or the years ahead, but the decades ahead. And in particular, I think he will highlight all of the areas of potential — the economic potential of our relationship.”
If one reads between the lines of the White House briefing of 19 July, Washington is all set to use India as an effective counter to Pakistan in Afghanistan and China in Asia Pacific. Here are the main points that will be on the high table as Biden meets his Indian interlocutors, beginning with two very important strategic issues.
1. Afghanistan
A very important point that has emerged from the White House briefing on Biden’s India visit is that Washington has described India as “an essential partner” in the Afghanistan process. This must be music to the Indian strategic-diplomatic community’s ears when the American-Nato troops’ drawdown is scheduled to begin in less than seven months from now. Sample the quotes:
“From the US perspective, India is an essential partner in a peaceful and stable Afghanistan and a prosperous Afghanistan. And India’s role in Afghanistan has been characterized by a number of different features. One would be its important role as a development partner and in supporting economic development in Afghanistan; also supporting the institutions of the Afghan state, and in facilitating commercial investment on — at a significant level in Afghanistan to create the conditions for peace, prosperity, and stability.
“The circumstances in Afghanistan are the subject of very close consultations between our governments, and … it’s also very clear from our perspective in our consultations with the Indians that we share the view that an Afghan-led process that results in a democratic, peaceful, and stable Afghanistan is the core outcome that we are looking for and, again, the Indian role is an important one in contributing to regional peace and stability.”
2. Asia Pacific
Biden will play to the hilt Washington’s policy of “rebalancing” the Asia pacific and develop India as its most promising counter weight to China. India should refrain from doing so and keep its cards close to its chest. Its policy should be to go with the US covertly but showing nothing like that overtly so that it keeps both China and the US guessing – and interested.
On 18 July Biden gave a significant speech in which he laid out the American vision for moving forward with the Asia-Pacific rebalance policy that President announced and that the entire American national security team is invested in. The overarching American goal in the Asia Pacific is to tie together the nations of the region from India to the western shores of the Americas through strong partnerships, institutions, alliances and rules of the road. The US, like India, has been harping on “freedom of navigation” in international waters, an obvious rejection of China’s sovereignty claims in South China Sea and East China Sea regions.
3. Economic Cooperation
The two sides quintupled bilateral trade to $ 100 billion in just 13 years and would strive to quintuple it yet again, though this time in much shorter time. Biden will focus on issues from investment policy to intellectual property and speak on how the two sides can work together and close the gap between desire and action.
4. Energy and Climate
The Indo-US civilian nuclear cooperation agreement is in a limbo and savaging it will be one of the high priorities of Biden. The issue will be on Biden’s front burner when he meets his Indian interlocutors. Climate-related issues will also come up for intense discussion.
5. Defence
Like all other foreign visitors, Biden too would be donning the cap of a salesman and pitching various multi-billion dollars worth new defence projects to India. The current American defence portfolio in India is already $ 9 billion.
Besides, the two sides have embarked upon several defence cooperation projects in South Asia and in Asia Pacific relating to maritime security and counterterrorism. The status of this cooperation will be reviewed.
A lot of interesting new things are set to happen in Indo-US bilateral relations. Biden’s visit is expected to both identify and expedite this agenda. Watch this space.
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