Monday, March 11, 2019

A crowded senatorial field

PerryScope
By Perry Diaz

Just like past midterm elections, the political exercises halfway through the six-year presidential term is a harbinger of how the next presidential football is shaped. Who are the quarterbacks? Who are the players? Who are the coaches? And who will be traded?

It is a game where the opposing teams give no quarter and take no prisoners. The stakes are high… very high, indeed. Whoever wins will control the nation’s politics for a long time to come. And the losers will be thrown – sad to say -- into oblivion, never to resurface again for a long, long time. Such is the life of a loser in Philippine politics.

The political football began on July 23, 2018 when former President and Congresswoman Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo staged a coup d’état against the Speaker right in front of the President who was about to deliver his State of the Nation Address (SONA), members of Congress and their wives and mistresses dressed and ready for any surprises that would spring out. Poor Speaker Pantaleon Alvarez, reputedly President Rodrigo Duterte’s right-hand man in the House of Thieves -- short for Representathieves -- who suffered the ignominy of being thrown out of his own House.

Musical chair
How did Gloria do it? Known for seizing an opportunity before anyone else can, Gloria reportedly used the rift between Speaker Alvarez and Davao City Mayor Sara Duterte-Carpio, the president’s daughter, to pursue her Machiavellian goal. It was said that the rift was fueled when Alvarez allegedly called Duterte-Carpio a part of the opposition when she formed a separate regional political party, Hugpong ng Pagbabago (HNP).

That was the season-opener for the 2019 midterms. Sara told reporters that HNP was willing to forge alliances with other political parties. It encouraged some lawmakers from the ruling PDP-Laban to consider jumping ship to Lakas-CMD, which was Arroyo’s political party during her presidency.

What we’re seeing now is the start of the game played by turncoats, popularly known as the “balimbings,” whose loyalty is not to their party or their candidate but to themselves. To a lot of them, it’s a matter of self-preservation… or survival. It’s like a musical chair; if you’re not fast enough to switch, you’re out of the game.

Sara makes a move
On August 13, 2018, Mayor Duterte-Carpio announced the formation of a super-coalition of three national parties and six local or regional parties. The three national parties are the Nacionalista Party (NP), Nationalist People’s Party (NPC), and National Unity Party (NUP). The six local parties are: Hugpong ng Pagbabago (HNP), a regional party founded by Duterte-Carpio not too long ago; Ilocano Timpuyog; Alyansa Bol-anon Alang sa Kausaban (Abaka); Aggrupation of Party for Progress (APP); Kambilan; PaDayon Pilipino (PP); and Serbisyo sa Bayan Party.

Joining forces with Duterte-Carpio are big political quarterbacks Sen. Cynthia Villar of the NP, former President and now Speaker Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and tycoon Eduardo “Danding” Cojuangco Jr.., founder the NPC when he ran for President in 1992.

Duterte-Carpio told the media that it was her father, President Duterte, who gave her and her supporters the go-ahead to form HNP. But it doesn’t take a genius to figure out what President Duterte had in mind. He sees in Sara someone who is a natural heir to his expanding political domain that has the prospect of becoming the country’s next preeminent political dynasty, if not already. Actually, Sara is the only one among Duterte’s three children by his first marriage who is ready to step up to the plate and carry out her father’s political agenda.

In a calculated move last September, Sara denied that she would be running for Senator this year. “I am not running for senator. We are just really trying to unite everybody who wants to help the administration of President Duterte until 2022,” she said. She should have added, “…and beyond.”

Sara’s game plan
In my article, “How high would Sara go?” (September 7, 2018), I wrote: “She [Sara Duterte-Carpio] would be Duterte’s political heir in 2022 when his presidential term expires. The question is: Is she prepared and ready to take over from her father?

“She might not be as prepared to run for president but she is ready. She has the gumption to fight an intense and contentious presidential campaign. She got that from her dad. But she should also be aware that some of her rivals in the presidential derby might be her allies today. As we all know, political turncoats or ‘balimbings’ would emerge from the murky shadows of political expedience.

“But if Sara plays her cards right, and with her father’s strong political influence, she just might end up with an unbeatable Royal Flush hand. But there is a caveat when you’re playing high-stake politics. If you fall, it would be with a big thud in which you’re unlikely to recover.”

The Senatoriables
The senatorial field is crowded. There are 62 candidates vying for 12 Senate seats. There are 51 male candidates and 11 female candidates. Among them are seven reelectionists and seven who are seeking a comeback, including 95-years-old Juan Ponce Enrile.

Interestingly, Sara’s HNP is supporting two Senate slates. The first one consists of the eight bets it will endorse nationwide, while the second HNP list contains the 14 senatorial candidates it will endorse in the Davao Region, her bailiwick.

There are a lot of wannabes in the senatorial field but eventually it would be a battle between the administration and the opposition candidates. Grace Poe tops the senatoriables with 67.4% but it is doubtful if she’d run this time around. Rep. Pia Cayetano who placed second with 55.7% might be tempted to run for president and fall back to vice president if she fails. Sen. Cynthia Villar who placed third with 50.1% might throw her name for president but would quickly settle for vice president. Sara Duterte-Carpio, although a non-candidate, is fourth place with 46.2%. And Imee Marcos placed 14th with 29.9% but she vowed that she’d win.. But right now, it’s a no-brainer; the bets are on Duterte-Carpio and Robredo running as administration and opposition candidates, respectively.

As for Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, nobody knows what she’s vying for. But right now, we’ll just have to take her word that she’d be writing her memoirs, which I surmise will be titled, “Why I failed to become Prime Minister?” I understand it’s going to make it to the “Best Selling Fictional Stories.”

And how about President Duterte and Bongbong Marcos? Bongbong was once Duterte’s “manok” for President. Well, from what’s going around in the rumor mill today, Duterte promised Bongbong that they’d still be “Best Friends Forever.” Bongbong should know better, “Blood is thicker than politics.” And besides, whoever believes that there are permanent friends? Not even permanent enemies. The only thing that’s permanent is self-interest..

And to the “balimbings” who didn’t make it, all I can say is, “Hey, better luck next time. Never give up.” Someday, you’d be running for President. Most of those who became President were “balimbings.”

And remember, in Philippine elections, there are no losers, only the winners and those who were cheated.

Monday, March 4, 2019

Is the Philippines the next Djibouti?

PerryScope
By Perry Diaz
Chinese troops march in Djibouti in celebration of Djibouti’s Independence Day.
Chinese troops march in Djibouti in celebration of Djibouti’s Independence Day.
A tiny impoverished but strategically located country by the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait in the Horn of Africa, Djibouti has become a much-coveted property among powerful nations.
In 2001, Djibouti leased Camp Lemonnier, a former French Foreign Legion garrison, to the U.S., along with the right to use the neighboring airport and port facilities. Next to Camp Lemonnier are four other military bases: a French airbase, a Japanese Self-Defense Force Base, an Italian base, and a Saudi Arabian base. In 2015, China began negotiations to create a logistical support base in Djibouti to support China’s anti-piracy operations in the region.
China’s military base shows tanks and troops.
China’s military base shows tanks and troops.
But little did Djiboutian President Ismael Omar Guelleh know that China’s use of the Djibouti base is to increase her power projection capabilities in the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean. As soon as the base became operational in 2017, China started deploying troops, tanks, and warships to the base. China did not disclose how many troops would be stationed at the base. But previous reports have put the size at 10,000.
Infrastructure
The new Ethiopia-Djibouti electric railway.
The new Ethiopia-Djibouti electric railway.
In January 2017, the Chinese-built 728-km Ethiopia-Djibouti electric train was completed. The joint venture between China and Djibouti cost $4 billion, which was financed by China. Djibouti also partnered with China’s state-owned China Merchants Ports Holdings Company or CMPort to build the Doraleh Multipurpose Port. CMPort was the same state-owned corporation that built and financed the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka. Recently, Guelleh announced the new Djibouti International Free Trade Zone, a $3.5-billion venture with China, as a “hope for thousands of young jobseekers.” But while it might provide jobs for the 800,000 Djiboutians, the costs add up to the skyrocketing public debt, which accounts for 88% of the country’s $1.72 billion GDP, of which China owns a large portion. And the question is: How will Djibouti repay the humongous loans from China?
Debt trap
Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port that was leased to China for 99 years after defaulting on $13 billion loans on various projects.
Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port that was leased to China for 99 years after defaulting on $13 billion loans on various projects.
Djibouti’s unfortunate debt trap could result in giving control of these projects to China just like what happened to Sri Lanka who was forced to turn over control of the Hambantota port to the Chinese. Sri Lanka racked up a debt of more than $13 billion to Chinese state-owned banks. These banks charged predatory interest rates as high as 7%, which is too high to service. Eight out of the 68 countries involved in China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) Initiative are facing unsustainable debt levels.
Some 10,000 miles east is another country that is at risk of falling into China’s debt trap – the Philippines. During his state visit to the Philippines last November 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Philippine counterpart Rodrigo Duterte signed 29 agreements that include the following: Cooperation on the OBOR Initiative; Joint Oil and Gas Exploration and Development; and Infrastructure cooperation program between the Philippines and China.
With China’s high interest rates, the Philippine government’s debt of approximately $123 billion could rise to over $1 trillion in 10 years. Given the humongous loans that the country gets from China, what’s the likelihood of China taking possession of Philippine assets if she defaults on her loans? There are lucrative assets that China could take over such as the oil-rich Recto Bank, Benham Rise, Malampaya gas field, Clark and Subic Bay Freeport Zones, Port of Manila, Port of Cebu, mining companies, and others.
It’s interesting to note that infrastructure projects are usually debt traps if the debtors don’t have the ability to service the loans due to inadequate revenues. Take the case of the Marcos administration where it embarked on a rapid infrastructure program in the 1980s. I remember going to a trade show at the Philippine Trade Training Center in 1985 and was shocked to see the place virtually empty except for a few cottage industries and processed food products for local consumption. There were no exportable products except for rattan furniture. The Philippines at that time was strapped for dollars due to poor export market and lack of revenue-generating manufacturing industries.
It is evident that China’s playbook is to liberally lend loans to underdeveloped countries at high interest rates. When the countries default on their loans, China would then foreclose the collaterals, which usually translate to 99-year lease agreements as in the case with Sri Lanka, Djibouti, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Mongolia, Montenegro, and the Maldives.
Subic Bay
Subic Bay
Subic Bay
Recently, a news report said that a former chief of the Philippine Navy warned over two Chinese firms’ possible takeover of the Hanjin Heavy Industries and Construction (HHIC) shipyard in Subic, Zambales. “Let’s be aware that this Hanjin shipyard issue is not just about business, financial and other economic issues. This is a very significant national issue!” former Navy chief Vice Admiral Alexander Pama said in his Facebook post. He warned that China’s ownership of Hanjin’s shipyard would give unlimited access to one of the Philippines most strategic geographic naval and maritime asset. He then urged both government and private sector to go against China’s possible ownership of the shipyard.
Subic Bay was once the home to one of the largest US naval bases. It served as a repair and supply depot due to its strategic location. It was around 260 kilometers from the Scarborough Shoal, the subject of territorial dispute between the Philippine and China. When the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) between the US and the Philippines expired in 1991, attempts to extend the life of MBA failed in the Philippine Senate. The following year all US forces and bases in the country left. However, part of the base remained as a locally operated logistical supply facility for American warships and submarines.
The former American naval base was converted into commercial and industrial use, administered by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). One of the biggest tenants was the HHIC shipyard. Recently, HHIC filed for rehabilitation due to slowdowns in the global shipping industry. Subsequently, two major Chinese shipbuilders indicated their interest in taking over the HHIC operations.
If a Chinese company’s bid is successful, it would be a major victory for China, who had been trying to establish a solid foothold in the Philippines, not only commercial and industrial, but military as well. And considering the close personal relationship between Duterte and Xi, there is a strong likelihood that the facility would be awarded to a China state-owned firm.
Power projection
China’s Strategic Triangle that would control passage from South China to the Western Pacific through the Bashi Channel.
China’s Strategic Triangle that would control passage from South China to the Western Pacific through the Bashi Channel.
The main purpose of the Chinese logistical support base is to replenish their supplies for her military bases in the Spratlys that are closer than Mainland China. As such, it would then be proper to say that a Chinese presence in Subic Bay is just like the Chinese military base in Djibouti, which would play a crucial role in projecting China’s power in the South China Sea and beyond. It would provide China with the capability to connect Subic Bay to Scarborough Shoal to the Paracel Islands; thus, denying the US free and unimpeded passage in the South China Sea to the Western Pacific through the Bashi Channel between Northern Philippines and Taiwan. Later on, China could also take control of the Bashi Channel to take complete control of the First Island Chain, a 30-year Chinese dream.
Meanwhile, Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana told a Senate hearing that Duterte was “very receptive” to the idea of the state being a minority investor in a private sector-led rescue of HHIC. Sounds like a great idea. But there is a caveat to this: Would the Chinese companies be allowed to take substantial stock holdings in the takeover of HHIC? Or could it be that President Duterte was in one of his “dyok only” moments?
At the end of the day, one doesn’t fail to notice: Is the Philippines the next Djibouti?
(PerryDiaz@gmail.com)

Saturday, March 2, 2019

A referendum on democracy

ON DISTANT SHORE
By Val G. Abelgas
 Just like all mid-term elections, the coming May elections should be treated as a referendum on whether the people approve of the performance and policies of the present administration and whether they want the same policies to continue in the next three years.
With the death of the two-party system and the emergence of patronage-based political coalitions since the supposed re-birth of democracy in the country in 1986, the once-every-three-years elections have become a political circus rather than a political exercise. Unlike when the Nacionalista Party and the Liberal Party fought hard to gain control of Malacanang or Congress, elections are now being contested by fleeting coalitions, ones that are based more on patronage and personality, rather than on platforms.
So don’t expect a full slate of the dominant parties, such as LP, NP or PDP-Laban. Instead, you’ll see coalitions, whose names sound more like showbiz slogans rather than political parties. For example, there is the Otso Deretso, whose Senate line-up includes four LP members and four other oppositionists; the Hugpong ng Pagbabago, a coalition led by presidential daughter and Davao City Mayor Sara Duterte which is endorsing 13 senatorial candidates (one more than the 12 slots being contested) mostly pro-Duterte and pro-Arroyo politicians; Tapang at Malasakit Alliance, also composed mostly of pro-Duterte politicians from the PDP-Laban and Nacionalista Party; Partido Federal ng Pilipinas, composed of unknown politicians supporting Duterte, Arroyo and and their proposal to shift to a federal system; and Cojuangco-led Nationalist People’s Coalition, also composed of pro-Duterte politicians.
Based on the composition of the above coalitions, there are eight opposition senatorial candidates and the rest of the 76 official candidates are mostly supporters of President Duterte, potentially ensuring that Congress will continue to be controlled by Duterte and his new partner, former President and now House Speaker Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.
Thus, unless the Filipino voters fully support the eight Otso Deretso candidates and four of the more independent bets, we can almost be certain that the balance of power will be heavily tilted in favor of the Executive Branch, which will the have full control of the Senate, the House of Representatives and consequently, the Supreme Court.
The coming May political exercise, just like all mid-term elections, should thus be treated by Filipinos as a referendum both on Duterte and democracy. Should we let President Duterte continue to with his affront on human rights and the rule of law, and lead with iron fists, unchecked by both Congress and the Judiciary? Should we vote for senatorial and congressional candidates who turn a blind eye on Duterte’s strongman tactics? Or should we vote to start realigning our ship back to the democratic path?
The just concluded mid-term elections in the United States have proven that democracy is well and alive in the country. With the Democrats having wrested control of the House of Representatives with plenty of room to spare, the tantrums of President Donald Trump have been put under check as in the case of the battle over the border wall, in which the Donald would have built that stupid wall if not checked by the Speaker Nancy Pelosi-led and Democrat-controlled House.
The American people, through the ballots, made it known that they’ve had enough of Trump’s capricious and whimsical leadership. Thus, the constitutionally mandated check and balance among the three branches of government – the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary – remains in force.
For three years since the former Davao mayor was elected president in 2016, with an overwhelming lead over LP bet Manuel Roxas, but a minority president nevertheless, having won only 39 percent of the total number of votes, Duterte has had absolute control over the House of Representatives.
The usual political butterflies quickly joined forces with the winning presidential candidate even before they could all be sworn in as congressmen, ensuring Duterte complete control of the House of Representatives. For three years, they have toed the line, either afraid of suffering the same fate as opposition Sen. Leila de Lima, losing out in the distribution of the spoils, or losing crucial Malacanang support in these coming elections, or all of the above.
But the Senate, which is the upper and far more superior chamber, has remained somehow independent and has been doing its best to keep Duterte under check. Senators like Ping Lacson, Antonio Trillanes, Franklin Drilon, Grace Poe, Risa Hontiveros, Francis Pangilinan, Sonny Angara, Bam Aquino and even PDP-Laban’s Koko Pimentel, independent Francis Escudero and NP’s Francis Eescudero, have stood many times to criticize Duterte’s policies and reckless remarks, and to keep Duterte’s dictatorial tendencies in check.
Political pundits have given up on the House of Representatives, especially now that it’s led by Arroyo. But hopes remain high for the Senate. And it is the race for the 12 senators – half of the Senate composition – that will be the most crucial if democracy were to remain alive and well in the country that once boasted as the only democracy in Asia.
A Duterte-controlled Senate could mean the entire Congress would just be a rubber stamp of a Chief Executive that once threatened to declare a revolutionary government and who has shown little respect for the rule of law or for democracy. He could ram down unreasonable legislations like lowering the age of criminal liability to nine years as he had originally proposed; force the shift to federal system through a constituent assembly; and force other unpopular or unreasonable measures without the necessary debates.
He can do as he pleases without fear of congressional oversight or impeachment. He can name anybody to the Supreme Court who is willing to do his bidding and clamp down on dissent with even more force.
Should we vote to keep Duterte on check or should we just let democracy die an ignoble death? You decide.
(valabelgas@aol.com)