News Release
Pacific News Center (Guam News)
Pacific News Center (Guam News)
Washington D.C. Thursday night in Washington, the U.S. Senate unanimously approved an amendment offered by Senator Jim Webb (D-Va.) to reaffirm the United States’ commitment to Japan under Article V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, and to firmly counter any attempts to challenge Japan’s administration of the Senkaku Islands. Senators James Inhofe (R-Okla.), Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.), and John McCain (R-Ariz.) cosponsored the amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.
“This amendment is a strong statement of support for a vital ally in Pacific Asia,” said Senator Webb. “Over the past several years, China has taken increasingly aggressive actions to assert its claim over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea and in a broad expanse of the South China Sea. This amendment unequivocally states that the United States acknowledges the administration of Japan over the Senkaku Islands, and that this position will not be changed through threats, coercion, or military action.”
The amendment reiterated the U.S. national interest in freedom of navigation, peace and stability, respect for international law, and unimpeded lawful commerce. It also noted U.S. opposition to any efforts to coerce, threaten to use force, or use force to resolve territorial issues. The amendment concludes by reaffirming the commitment of the United States to the defense of territories under the administration of Japan, as stated in Article V of the Treaty.
Senator Webb has expressed concerns over maritime territorial disputes in this region for more than 16 years. His first hearing upon assuming chairmanship of the Senate Foreign Relations East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee was on maritime territorial disputes in Asia in July 2009. He revisited this issue in the subcommittee in September 2012.
Senator Webb has worked and traveled throughout East Asia and Southeast Asia for more than four decades—as a Marine Corps Officer, a defense planner, a journalist, a novelist, a senior official in the Department of Defense, Secretary of the Navy, and as a business consultant.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
SEC. 1246. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON THE SITUATION IN THE SENKAKU ISLANDS.
It is the sense of the Senate that—
(1) the East China Sea is a vital part of the maritime commons of Asia, including critical sea lanes of communication and commerce that benefit all nations of the Asia-Pacific region;
(2) the peaceful settlement of territorial and jurisdictional disputes in the East China Sea requires the exercise of self-restraint by all parties in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and destabilize the region, and differences should be handled in a constructive manner consistent with universally recognized principles of customary international law;
(3) while the United States takes no position on the ultimate sovereignty of the Senkaku islands, the United States acknowledges the administration of Japan over the Senkaku Islands;
(4) the unilateral actions of a third party will not affect United States acknowledgement of the administration of Japan over the Senkaku Islands;
(5) the United States has national interests in freedom of navigation, the maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international law, and unimpeded lawful commerce;
(6) the United States supports a collaborative diplomatic process by claimants to resolve territorial disputes without coercion, and opposes efforts at coercion, the threat of use of force, or use of force by any claimant in seeking to resolve sovereignty and territorial issues in the East China Sea; and
(7) the United States reaffirms its commitment to the Government of Japan under Article V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security that “[e]ach Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes”.
http://www.pacificnewscenter.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=29470:senate-approves-webb-amendment-to-reaffirm-us-commitment-to-japan-on-the-senkaku-islands&catid=45:guam-news&Itemid=156
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U.S. clarifies to Beijing, no neutrality over Japan’s claim to Senkaku Islands
By Adam Westlake
The Japan Daily Press
The Japan Daily Press
Richard Armitage, the U.S.’s former Deputy Secretary of State, stated in a recent interview that while the country hasn’t voiced an opinion on whether Japan or China has the stronger claim to the disputed Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands, that doesn’t mean it’s neutral. The U.S. official was speaking about his late-October trip to Beijing and Tokyo where he and a delegation addressed concerns over the increasing tensions between the two Asian superpowers.
Armitage says there were clearly misunderstandings in Beijing over the fact that the U.S. had not clearly taken a side on the sovereignty of the disputed territory. Referring to Japan, the diplomat said that the U.S. is not neutral when one of its allies is being coerced, intimidated, or the victim of aggression. Armitage further pointed out that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty implies that the U.S. has a responsibility for defending the Senkakus, and that hardly makes the country neutral.
It seems apparent that Armitage was making the point that U.S. hasn’t stated a clear opinion in an effort to avoid further fanning the flames between China and Japan, but if push came to shove, it would be clear who they stand with. Ever since that late-October visit, heads have started to cool, with both countries’ leaders agreeing to stay in communication. Armitage feels that the lowering of temperatures and rhetoric is certainly helpful, but a more permanent solution will have to wait until next year, after Japan’s prime minister elections in December and China’s leadership change in March.
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Is the U.S. Committed to Defend the Senkakus? Text of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty
China’s Vice President Xi Jinping (L) and US Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta review a guard of honor before their meeting at the Pentagon in Washington, DC, on February 14, 2012. China’s likely next leader Xi Jinping said that Beijing will take concrete steps to improve human rights as he admitted “there is always room for improvement.” AFP Photo/Jewel Samad (Photo credit should read JEWEL SAMAD/AFP/Getty Images)
On Sunday, September 23, NHK news broadcast a video of U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta seated next to and speaking with Chinese Vice Chairman and soon-to-be supreme leader Xi Jinping on September 19 in Beijing. During that meeting, reported NHK, Panetta told Xi that U.S. policy is that the Senkaku islands (claimed as Chinese territory by Beijing) are covered by the U.S.-Japan security alliance. If there is military conflict, the U.S. is obliged under the alliance to intervene.
The September 21st Yomiuri Shimbun, cited testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for Asian Affairs Kurt Campbell to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the day before confirming that the Senkakus come under Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. Campbell said that U.S. policy on this has been clear since 1997.
Watching and listening carefully to what the Chinese side has made of the Panetta visit, my sense is very different to what may seem to be the meaning and implications of the above.
First, I have seen no mention in the state-controlled Chinese media of Panetta’s comment on the U.S. obligation under the U.S.-Japan treaty. What the media has prominently reported has been Panetta’s affirmation to Xi that U.S. policy ‘takes no sides’ on territorial disputes in Asia, including that over the Senkakus/Diaoyudao. This is also long-standing U.S. policy.
Partly owing to the almost unimaginable power of the weapons and men his department commands, but also his relative gravitas, Panetta has the most credibility in China of any U.S. government official. It was noteworthy that Chinese official media accentuated Panetta’s upbeat appraisal of U.S.-China relations and plans for stepping up exchanges and joint exercises between U.S. and Chinese military forces.
So which is it? Is U.S. policy that we are ready to go to war with China to defend the Senkakus? Didn’t we say we “take no position” on the matter? The answer–in the subtle and often paradoxical and contradictory realm of foreign relations–is both, or, more likely, neither. But we should not think that the subtlety and ambiguity of these positions leaves all sides with the same comfort, options, and risks.
What does Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty actually say though? Here it is:
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.
I am reminded of an interview given about two years ago by Japan’s last genuinely successful prime minister, Nakasone Yasuhiro, whose tenure roughly matched Reagan’s. Advising how Japan should conduct its foreign policy, and particularly the pivotal relationship with the U.S., Nakasone was trenchantly realistic: Japan should endeavor to procure (in the legal sense of “cause to do”) U.S. power to serve Japan’s interests and objectives.
In the case of the Senkakus, this seems to have happened. Or at least, when the Noda government felt compelled to respond to the force majeure situation created by Tokyo governor Ishihara’s bid to buy the islands, and decided upon nationalization, the U.S.-Japan treaty was available as perhaps the decisive element that gave the decision makers the confidence they needed to make the decision.
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