Behind the Headlines
by BUNN NAGARA
TheStar.com
by BUNN NAGARA
TheStar.com
Whatever China’s purpose in raising its military profile in East Asian waters, it is serving nobody’s interests.
Admiral Locklear: Testifying in Congress that a new Chinese ballistic missile could be aimed at US aircraft carriers. Admiral Locklear: Testifying in Congress that a new Chinese ballistic missile could be aimed at US aircraft carriers.
MILITARY face-offs in the South China Sea are now into their third phase over a period of some eight months.
Subtly muscular postures continue to involve the world’s three biggest economies – the United States, China and Japan – and tensions have not subsided as much as had been expected. Smaller countries with other disputed territorial claims are also part of the picture.
Relations between China and Japan plummeted last September after Tokyo “purchased” three of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from their private Japanese owners. Meanwhile, tensions between China and the Philippines, and Vietnam, have soared and declined without really going away.
The current third phase of military manoeuvres is more varied in form, being no longer purely naval in nature. It is also keeping relations across the waters more hot than warm, although not yet simmering.
Diplomatic spats between the Philippines and China last year over disputed islands were supposed to have dissipated by the first quarter of this year. But such tensions ebb and flow like the tides.
On March 20, a large Chinese supply ship was seen unloading construction materials onto one of the Kalayaan Islands claimed by the Philippines. Its purpose seemed to be more than just planting a flag.
A week later, four Chinese naval vessels conducted a military exercise in the waters and outcrops of Malaysia’s Beting Serupai (James Shoal), also claimed by China as part of its southernmost maritime territory.
The occasion that involved a destroyer, two frigates and an amphibious landing vessel together with naval helicopters, hovercraft and amphibious tanks was widely publicised in China’s media. It is doubtful if those media reports mentioned that the territory was disputed by some of China’s neighbours and trading partners.
This was the closest yet that Chinese military vessels have come to Malaysian shores (80km from Bintulu) without approval or invitation. What else but testing Malaysian reactions can be the purpose, since the action will invite only negative perceptions of Beijing all-round?
Malaysia has been calm and diplomatic enough not to protest loudly and openly. If China has been watching Malaysian reactions closely, the converse is also true.
These moves by the People’s Liberation Army’s Navy (PLA-N) are not entirely new, as it had ventured this way three times in the last decade (1993, 1994 and 2000). But it remains unclear why it chose to do so again so soon after creating a scene with the Philippines and Vietnam, fellow Asean countries with Malaysia.
Could Beijing be trying to compare reactions from three different Asean countries? If so, it would also be comparing reactions from the far bigger players Japan and the US.
Last year, the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) said China could soon deploy a new anti-ship ballistic missile, presumably the DF-21D. This would be another class of missiles that could target vital US naval assets in the Pacific.
Then 12 days ago, the chief of US Pacific Command, Admiral Samuel Locklear, testified in Congress that a new Chinese ballistic missile could be aimed at US aircraft carriers. In the event of conflict, neutralised carriers would effectively mean the end of naval projections.
On Friday, the DIA announced in Washington that the Chinese military had already deployed the 1,500km-range DF-21D on China’s south coast facing Taiwan. More than ever before, US strategists have suddenly grown anxious about the prospects of their forward deployments.
However, there is little or nothing in substance to worry the overpowering presence of US forces in the region. So far China’s manoeuvres can at most only prod requests by defence planners in some countries for bigger budgets, whose expenditures have a logic of their own anyway.
The biggest worry for US military planners is how precision-guided missiles like the DF-21D can neutralise naval assets before the latter can disrupt the former during flight. The result: more research, more technology and more expenditure on a new class of equipment and weapons to do the work.
There is little doubt that the PLA-N has grown somewhat more adventurous in this maritime region. China’s military forces have also generally grown in capability, even though it remains largely underdeveloped for a country of its size and economic standing.
Even decades from now, China will still be unable to match the US in military sophistication and firepower. This further confirms China’s current purpose as merely testing US reactions.
At the same time, Beijing has also been using its fighter jets for aerial surveillance and “testing” purposes. This has involved airspace over or near the Senkakus/Diaoyus in the East China Sea.
Tokyo complains that it has had to respond to more than 300 Chinese aerial missions in 12 months, nearly twice the number over the year before. And Japan’s response has been the use of fighter jets for monitoring purposes of its own.
That in turn has prompted complaints by China about Japan raising tensions in the region. To Beijing, its flights have kept away from Japanese territory, with only one report of a Chinese aircraft violating Japanese airspace.
All of this goes against the grain of Chinese strategic thinking of recent decades, which has stressed lowering the profile of military adventure while building relations within and between regions.
Testing the reactions of other states is a common and useful objective, but not at the expense of souring relations or the loss of diplomatic capital. Besides, there can be less costly ways to gauge the political standing and military positions of other nations.
Within China itself, there is little question of the (new) civilian leadership having to give in to some of the more venturesome generals. The party and state leadership has consistently kept the military under control except for times of grave national crisis.
Since Beijing’s purpose seems to be to assess the reactions of various countries, these countries need to respond in ways that clearly express the message they need to convey. And that, simply put, would be that China is losing more than it can gain both for the present and the future.
Beijing has had no real need to assign ships or aircraft to areas that are disputed. It must surely know by now that such actions are not only likely to lose friends and influence over people, but would also sow suspicion on all its future actions.
Furthermore, actions that can be deemed unwelcome or be portrayed as aggressive are only likely to invite similar actions from other countries, including the US. And that cannot be in the interest of any country in the region.
Militaristic actions have the knack of triggering similar reactions from other countries. The same goes for peaceful diplomatic moves; the intelligent choice should be clear enough.
Whether the region as a whole progresses towards the latter, or descends towards the former, depends on the more powerful countries that carry bigger clout. That is sometimes a painful reality that the rest of the region has had to learn to live with.
Since the US, China and Japan also happen to be the world’s three biggest economies, their choice of continued peace, stability and prosperity should never be in doubt. Opting for anything else would be the height of international irresponsibility and global insanity.
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