What’s China up to now?

ON DISTANT SHORE
By Val G. Abelgas

China has upped the ante in the raging dispute over a group of isles and shoals in the South China Sea (West Philippine Sea) with the recent announcement by its Hainan Province of new fishing rules in the area.

The new rules, which took effect on January 1, 2014, require foreign fishermen to seek Beijing’s permission to operate within most of the vast, strategic waterway. The move followed Beijing’s declaration of a new Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in November requiring foreign planes to notify Beijing of flights over a huge swath of the East China Sea, where China is locked in a bitter territorial dispute with Japan.

The latest move is obviously part of China’s strategy to “try to establish its sovereignty over contested areas through the use of a combination of military power and international law” as The Diplomat writer Zachary Zeck put it.

In the case of the air defense zone over the Shinkoku Islands in the East China Sea, China seeks to establish its sovereignty over the disputed islands by showing the world that it is administering the area’s air space and that other nations are recognizing such administration, thus sovereignty, when airliners identify themselves to Chinese authorities and give information on their flight plan and nationality.

In the same vein, China announced the new maritime rules to further establish its sovereignty over the disputed area in the South China Sea, which is also being claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei. By acquiescing to the Chinese demand for permission, it can be interpreted later that the countries of these fishermen are basically recognizing China’s claimed sovereignty over the disputed islets and shoals.

There were reports the weeks following the ADIZ declaration over the area surrounding the Shinkoku Islands that China was planning to declare another air zone over the South China Sea, but apparently the Chinese leaders are more cunning than we had believed. To declare a second air zone would be more obvious than asking the officials of Hainan province, which was assigned jurisdiction by the Beijing leaders over the Sansha Islands (Ayungin Reef), to announce that it was enforcing an old fisheries law, with some technical revisions, beginning January 1, 2014 in all territories and surrounding water within its jurisdiction, including, of course, the disputed Sansha Islands.

That was obviously the original idea – and not an air zone over the South China Sea as generally believed – because the “technical revisions” were approved by Hainan province in November, the same time the ADIZ was declared over the East China Sea, and made public in mid-December.

Indeed, with the Hainan sea access rules, China could effectively gain control over vast areas of the South China Sea without declaring another air zone. The South China Sea and coastal passages from Malaysia to Russia are of vital economic interest to all who ply the shipping lanes and is used to ferry more than $1.2 trillion in goods annually between the United States and its Far East trading partners.

The United States protested the move, with State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki saying, “The passing of these restrictions on other countries’ fishing activities in disputed portions of the South China Sea is a provocative and potentially dangerous act.”

He said “China has not offered any explanation or basis under international law for these extensive maritime claims.” We hope, of course, that the US does not make a conflicting move this time as it did when it advised American airlines to notify Chinese authorities if they intended to fly over the air defense zone while protesting China’s action.

Malacanang insisted that Filipino fishermen do not have to seek permission from Chinese authorities because “under international law, no state can subject the high seas to its sovereignty.”

Foreign Affairs Secretary said, “This development escalates tensions, unnecessarily complicates the situation in the South China Sea, and threatens the peace and stability of the region. These regulations seriously violate the freedom of navigation and the right to fish of all states in the high seas, as provided for under UNCLOS (the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea).”

As if to complicate matters, reports surfaced this week that China was preparing to seize Pag-asa island in the disputed Spratlys Group, where the Philippines has built a 1.4-kilometer runway with a resident population of around 200 Filipinos, including soldiers.

“According to experts, the Chinese navy has drawn a detailed combat plan to seize the island and the battle will be restricted within the South China Sea. The battle is aimed at recovery of the island stolen by the Philippines from China,” the news site Qianzhan reported.

The report came after it was reported that the Philippines was deploying Air Force and Navy contingents to protect the island, which called the “occupation” “illegal” and “arrogant.”

It is highly doubtful that China really intends to invade Pag-asa island because if they did, why make public their military plan? But you never know with the way China has been acting since the ascension to power of Chinese leader Xi Jinping, who is believed to be doing everything to show the Chinese people that he is a strong leader.

The two recent developments — the restrictive and provocative Hainan fishing law and the report of a planned invasion on Pag-asa Island — are certain to escalate tension and place the region in the brink of war.

We must not forget that the Chinese invaded the Paracels in 1974 and gained control of the island after a battle with Vietnamese troops stationed in the island, killing 54 Vietnamese. And obviously they got away with it, and may be hoping that they would get away with another invasion of a disputed island.

Is China prepared to go to war that could bring in the Americans, or is it merely bluffing to see how far it can go in seizing control of the disputed area that is believed rich in oil and maritime resources and is highly desired by the Chinese as a drone base for its military surveillance activities? Or is it another ploy in what writer James Holmes describes as China’s effort “to achieve its goals short of war while reaping the propaganda harvest it would get from war”?

Whatever the intentions of China are, the country and its allies have to prepare for the eventuality that this increasingly dangerous dispute could turn into something more than a war of words.

(valabelgas@aol.com)